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1. Overview  
30% of Lebanon’s population are refugees and the country has taken in the most refugees per 
capita in the world with over 1.5 million in total.
1
 Given that Lebanon itself is recovering from civil 
war and has prominent political divisions, bad public services and strained infrastructure, the 
large number of refugees has exacerbated these pre-existing issues and pushed a large number 
of Lebanese citizens into poverty.  As the longevity of the conflict in Syria was not predicted from 
the outset, and due to the large number of refugees arriving, early humanitarian interventions 
focused on providing for Syrians’ basic needs, rather than on building resilience and ensuring 
good community relations. However, since 2014 there has been more focus from donors and the 
humanitarian community on building social cohesion. Nonetheless, many issues had already 
emerged between the communities and had become entrenched before donors and agencies 
sought to address them. 
This rapid review synthesises data from academic, policy and NGO sources on donor response 
to prevent and reduce tensions between Lebanese and refugees in refugee-hosting communities 
across Lebanon. The focus is on post 2011 and Syrian refugees as the complexity of social, 
cultural, and historical dynamics produce tensions that are unique to Syrians and Lebanese. The 
history of occupation and exploitation of Lebanon by Syria has created animosity in large 
sections of the population, whilst close trade, religious and family connections have created 
strong ties with other sections of the Lebanese population, leading to a complex situation of intra 
and intercommunity tension. There is limited evaluation of the success and failure of individual 
programmes to alleviate community tensions in the literature, with organisations involved 
publishing little critical reflection and scholars focusing on the issue more broadly. 
Key findings are as follows: 
 In order to counteract the negative perception of refugees in the media the UN and the 
Lebanese Information Ministry launched a joint media campaign in August 2017 aimed at 
improving relations and signed up a number of media outlets to provide more neutral 
reporting on refugees. 
 The UN has invested heavily since 2014 in improving infrastructure and services that 
have been negatively impacted by refugees; although this has benefitted the Lebanese 
population, it has not managed to address the scale of the issue. 
 The EU has also invested heavily in trying to counter the impact that refugees are having 
on services and infrastructure, but this also began post-2014 and considering the poor 
state of these prior to the arrival of refugees, the impact is again minimal. 
 The contentious political situation in Lebanon also negatively impacts on donors’ policies, 
for example, when the World Bank established a trust fund to help communities affected 
by the influx of Syrian refugees no political consensus was reached in Lebanon to 
disburse the funds.  
 A number of large donors helped establish the Reaching all Children with Education 
(RACE) programme, which aimed to improve government schools, get more Lebanese 
into non-private education, and school the large number of Syrian children. Although 
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great progress was made, again the scale of the issue (particularly with the large amount 
of Syrian children) made it difficult to fully address. 
 Food and fuel vouchers proved less successful than cash cards. Initiatives that provided 
cash cards for both vulnerable Syrians and Lebanese were able to mitigate tensions 
produced over the competition for resources and employment. 
 The Lebanon Host Communities Support Programme (LHSP) was launched in mid-2013 
by UNDP jointly with the Ministry of Social Affairs (MOSA) to ensure direct support was 
provided to the most vulnerable Lebanese communities. LHSP has increased livelihood 
and economic opportunities, strengthened local capacity to deliver services, improved 
local conflict resolution and security and more than 1 million Lebanese and 500,000 
Syrians have benefitted through the programme.
2
 
 Part of the success of LHSP is that it allows local municipalities and communities to be 
involved in highlighting local issues and developing solutions. However, job creation has 
been limited and employment is a core area of animosity between Lebanese and 
Syrians. 
 Since 2013 USAID has expanded its programmes in order to help host communities deal 
with the increasing strain of the large numbers of refugees. They train municipal leaders 
to work jointly with populations to carry out projects that improve services and create 
economic opportunities for all vulnerable communities, use micro agriculture schemes to 
supplement rural households’ income, and lend money to small businesses facing 
challenges related to Syrian refugees.  
 DFID funds have been important in areas like the Bekaa valley, where there is a high 
level of poverty and a large number of refugees. Initiatives include work schemes for both 
refugee and Lebanese populations, vaccinations and food for Lebanese livestock, repairs 
and upgrading of schools, water and sewage infrastructures.   
 At local level, Basmeh and Zeitooneh (BZ) – a Syrian-led group mainly operating in the 
Shatila refugee camp in Beirut – has promoted social cohesion through projects such as 
home renovation in the local community and cleaning campaigns with Lebanese and 
Syrian participants.  
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2. Community Tensions 
Lebanon has taken in the most refugees per capita in the world with over 1.5 million refugees in 
total – the majority from Syria – accounting for 30% of the country’s population.3 Lebanon itself is 
still recovering from conflict and before the Syrian conflict it was already beset by political 
divisions, insecure borders, severely strained infrastructure, and over-stretched public services – 
all which have been exacerbated by the large number of refugees (Kelly, 2017). The World Bank 
estimated that the effects of the Syrian refugees would push 170,000 Lebanese into poverty 
while doubling the unemployment rate (Integrity Consultancy, 2014: 12).  
Lebanon and Syria also have a long history, with Syria having strong political influence and a 
military presence in Lebanon between 1976 and 2005. As a result there is a division in Lebanon 
between those who support the Syrian regime and those that support opposition groups. These 
divisions, entrenched by the confessional system,
4
 transfer to decisions made on refugee 
policies (Kelly, 2017). On the one hand there is a history of occupation and exploitation of 
Lebanon by Syria, which has created animosity. Whilst on the other hand close trade, religious 
and family connections have created strong ties (Mercy Corps, 2013). Additionally, with 
Hezbollah’s support of the Assad regime and entry into the conflict, Lebanon was dragged into 
the war with cross-border conflict and assassination attempts of key security personnel (Betts et 
al., 2017).  
Incidents, such as that in Aarsal in August 2014 – where Syrian opposition fighters engaged in 
an armed stand-off with the Lebanese Army that resulted in the death of 19 Lebanese soldiers 
and 42 civilians, the wounding of hundreds of soldiers and civilians, and the capture of 29 
policemen and soldiers – have led to some level of a political consensus of the perceived danger 
of refugees to the already fragile stability in Lebanon (Kelly, 2017).   
The above-mentioned factors have led to the securitisation of refugees in Lebanon with security, 
infrastructure, services and the economy all being seen as being under threat. This is particularly 
visible in some of the more impoverished areas where there are often more refugees than local 
residents. As a result political parties have supported the tightening of borders, restriction of 
refugee movement, the eviction of refugees from sensitive areas, and have attempted to 
discourage refugees from prolonged stay (Kelly, 2017). 
In October 2014 the Lebanese government passed a new policy, known as the ‘October Policy’, 
which imposed restrictions on the free movement and residency of Syrians. The absence of a 
unified central government has led to local municipalities making many of the decisions with 
regard to policies, as well as what they will implement, which in turn has led to varied treatment 
of refugees across the country. The local policies implemented are often tied to identity politics 
and the local political economy. However, even in predominantly Sunni areas such as Tikrit, 
curfews have been implemented, whereas in Zahle the Christian mayor has not imposed curfews 
due to his professed liberal values (Betts et al., 2017).   
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 A system of government where political and institutional power is distributed proportionally among the 
confessional communities.  
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Social Relations 
In the impoverished areas of Lebanon, Syrian refugees have also unintentionally increased the 
vulnerability of the host communities through the increased competition for low paid work and by 
leading to rent increases. When paired with the increased strain on healthcare, services, and 
education, many of the vulnerable host community view themselves as much as victims of the 
crisis as the Syrian refugees. Additionally, humanitarian responses such as the targeted medical 
assistance – which provides medical aid to vulnerable Syrians – have created conflict, as a 
significant proportion of the Lebanese population cannot afford adequate health insurance and 
Syrians are seen to get preferential treatment. The visibility of UNHCR-funded initiatives only 
helps to highlight the perception that Syrians are prioritised (Integrity Consultancy, 2014).  
In a survey carried out in 2016 by UNHCR, 63% of the refugee population felt they were not 
welcome in Lebanon. Whereas, 27% of Lebanese surveyed considered their relationship with 
refugees to be good or very good. 40% of Lebanese respondents also reported hearing a 
number of negatives stories about refugees, mainly from the media and their neighbours. 50% of 
Syrian refugees surveyed also reported incidents with authorities or civilians, including 
harassment, insults, beating, eviction, and extortion (Alsharabati, 2017: 15-16). 
Although direct clashes between the two groups have remained minimal, there has been an 
increase in demonstrations and open protests. Road blockages in areas highly populated by 
Syrians took place for various reasons (Mercy Corps, 2013). Lebanese communities have 
identified worsening economic conditions due to the fall in tourism and cross-border trade as a 
result of the conflict in Syria, with refugees also being blamed. Syrians are also seen to offer 
cheaper labour than locals, whilst at the same time being seen to be responsible for the increase 
in rents. Participants noted reduced job opportunities, high unemployment, and an increase in 
poverty, crime, and arms proliferation (Saferworld, 2016).  
 
3. Alleviating Tension 
Media 
Perceptions of Syrian refuges have gradually worsened, and the media has played a significant 
role in this deterioration. Following the success of their earlier campaign in which many media 
outlets signed up to provide more neutral reporting on refugees, in August 2017 the UN and the 
Lebanese Information Ministry launched a joint media campaign under the slogan “I will Return to 
My Country and Invite You to Visit Me” with the aim of countering the negative impact the 
Lebanese media is having on relations between refugees and host communities.
5
  
Services 
Many of the areas refugees moved into were already impoverished, lacked infrastructure, and did 
not have enough water to provide for the increased population. As a result water was trucked in 
to refugees in informal settlements. However, due to donor investments this temporary solution 
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was eventually replaced with more sustainable options, such as investing in wells and reservoirs 
that also benefited the local host communities.  
UN Agencies 
UNHCR increased its budget for service provisions from  $170,000 in 2012 to over $24 million by 
the end of 2014. However, much of this was focused on planning that had been conceived prior 
to the Syrian conflict, and was compounded by the incorrect forecasting on the duration of the 
conflict.  Additionally, as Lebanon is a middle-income country, direct support to its institutions 
beyond technical and policy advice was often not accounted for in programme designs. For this 
reason programming with a resilience agenda was only introduced by UNHCR in 2014. Since 
2014, UNHCR has implemented a range of community support projects in areas where poverty 
levels and refugee numbers are high, with projects including new wells; water, sanitation and 
waste management facilities; community centres; improved medical facilities; youth education 
and sport activities and rehabilitation works. However, these projects are still unable to address 
the sheer scale of the impact of Syrian refugees on Lebanon. Particularly as the issue goes 
beyond providing for refugees, as it has had a significant economic impact too with trade, 
tourism, consumer confidence, and investment all falling and losing the government billions of 
dollars (Kelly, 2017).  
Since 2014 UN agencies have extended water networks; equipped municipalities with waste 
collection trucks; rehabilitated schools and health centres; and built local markets in order to 
mitigate the pressure placed on local communities as a result of the increase in Syrian refugees. 
UN investments and partnerships with local institutions to improve the effectiveness and 
reliability of water and sanitation provision led to 525,000 Lebanese benefitting in 2014 alone 
(UNHCR, 2015). Projects involved improvements in water production, water treatment, 
communal water storage, and water distribution. The UN and local partners built a number of 
reservoirs across the country, installed chlorinators and pipelines in order to provide Lebanese 
villages with safe drinking water, alongside assistance in sanitation and waste removal (UNHCR, 
2015).  
European Union 
The EU has also financed a range of projects at municipal level, including efforts to improve 
waste collection, water distribution, community services, and the delivery of public health, which 
to a certain extent have helped to ease tensions between the host and refugee communities. 
However, like many of the other efforts by donors and NGOs, these initiatives came late (post-
2014) when a number of issues between refugees and the host community had already emerged 
and become entrenched (Kelly, 2017). 
Lebanese Relief Council 
The Lebanese Relief Council (LRC) launched an initiative in Akkar to provide water and 
sanitation services in order to prevent tensions between refugees and the host community. Akkar 
is one of the poorest governorates in Lebanon and experienced poor socio-economic 
infrastructure prior to the large number of Syrian refugees that arrived. With the competition for 
limited resources by Syrians and Lebanese communities tensions and insecurity rose in Akkar. 
LRC worked with and through the municipality to gain approval for their projects and to get the 
municipality to identify needs, which would then be independently assessed by LRC. Through 
addressing waste removal and water needs, they help both Syrians and Lebanese. LRC also 
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addressed earlier short term planning and replaced wooden toilet seats installed by INGOs in the 
informal tented settlements with metal ones in order to improve hygiene and waste management. 
Additionally, LRC provided water to communities in the villages of Akroum and Kfartoun by 
organising the refill of water tanks. LRC has been particularly successful in managing 
relationships in the area; as they have become a key point of contact for the different 
communities and officials in Akkar, they are able to manage and address tensions relating to 
services when they arise. LRC has received funding from UN OCHA (Saferworld and Conciliation 
Resources, 2015).  
It is important to note that although there have been positive impacts on local communities from 
these investments, they come nowhere close to adequately reversing the impact that refugees 
have had on areas such as water, waste management, electricity and health, and other services. 
Particularly as there were significant service gaps prior to the arrival of Syrian refugees. 
Additionally, the political situation in Lebanon is also very relevant to donors’ operations, as when 
the World Bank established a trust fund to help the Lebanese government finance projects that 
would have helped Lebanese communities affected by the influx of Syrian refugees, the lack of 
political consensus to establish mechanisms to disburse the funds negatively impacted on the 
success (Kelly, 2017).  
Education 
The EU’s large-scale funding was particularly successful in education. The Ministry of Education 
and Higher Education (MEHE) with the support of several donor states, UNICEF, the World 
Bank, UNHCR, and other agencies strengthened the capacity of the public school system, which 
was severely lacking – 75% of Lebanese children attended private schools (Kelly, 2017). A three-
year programme, Reaching all Children with Education (RACE) was launched in 2014. The 
RACE initiative included the physical rehabilitation of schools, teacher training, accelerated 
learning programmes, and technical support to the Ministry. RACE improved the standard of 
education in government schools and also increased the number of refugee students in the 
schools, thus benefiting both host and refugee communities. It is argued by Kelly (2017) that it is 
an exemplar of the linking of humanitarian and development planning.  However, the large 
number of Syrian children made it difficult to get all children into the limited amount of existing 
schools.  
In 2014 RACE achieved the following (UNHCR, 2015):   
 2,675 staff and teachers of the Ministry of Education and Higher Education received 
training in active learning, classroom management, language and positive discipline.  
 93 schools were rehabilitated and supplied with computers and stationery. 
 270 public schools above 400m of altitude received funding for heating – increasing to 
600 schools in 2015.  
 A two shift teaching system was introduced and finances were provided for the salaries 
for the additional shift. 
 Vulnerable Lebanese children had their fees paid and received school supplies. 
Cash and Vouchers 
The food voucher programme spearheaded by the World Food Program, and implemented by 
NGOs like World Vision has encountered many challenges. However, it is also said to have 
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helped many local shops in tough economic times, as well as local producers. It helps to provide 
a livelihood for communities sharing limited resources with the refugees.
6
 UNICEF and three 
implementing partners (InterSOS, Terre de Hommes, Mercy Corps) distributed 120,000 clothing 
vouchers in winter-affected areas for vulnerable Lebanese and Syrian children (Mercy Corps, 
2015). 
Cash-based programming through multi-purpose cash cards has been successfully implemented 
in Jordan, but its introduction in Lebanon was initially resisted by the government, as they 
thought that poor Lebanese would resent refugees being given cash. However, the Lebanese 
government’s objection was addressed when cash-based programming was linked to 
improvements to Lebanon’s National Poverty Targeting Program (NPTP) when an emergency 
project was launched to expand and improve the social assistance package of the NPTP. The 
earlier food and fuel vouchers were not as successful, as they were often sold for less than face 
value (often through intimidation). Moreover, cash cards brought money into the local economy 
(Kelly, 2017). In November 2014 an e-card food assistance programme was launched through 
NPTP and targeted 27,200 vulnerable Lebanese. Similar to the programme offered to Syrian 
refugees, it allows families to buy food in designated shops. Not only does this programme 
detract from the animosity that some vulnerable Lebanese may have to Syrians receiving this 
assistance whilst they did not, it also helps vulnerable households and communities cope with 
the impact of the large amount of Syrian refugees (UNHCR, 2015). 
Following a successful pilot project the International Rescue Committee (IRC), funded by DFID, 
implemented an unconditional cross-sector cash programme in Akkar, North Lebanon, between 
February and October 2013. The programme provided monthly cash assistance via an ATM card 
to 700 Syrian refugee and 425 vulnerable Lebanese households. Prior to the Syrian war Akkar 
had the highest rate of poverty in Lebanon and since 2012 it has received a significant number of 
Syrian refugees, increasing the population by roughly 40%. Refugees compete for day labour, 
which is a significant source of income for impoverished Lebanese, and thus threaten income in 
an already fragile local economy. Moreover, vulnerable Lebanese are also in competition with 
Syrians for aid from religious groups and the local community. IRC’s aim was to mitigate tensions 
by assisting vulnerable households in both communities (Campbell, 2014).  
Social Cohesion 
Lebanon Host Communities Support Programme 
The Lebanon Host Communities Support Programme (LHSP) was launched in mid-2013 by 
UNDP jointly with the Ministry of Social Affairs (MOSA) to ensure direct support was provided to 
the most vulnerable Lebanese communities. It targets municipalities that were impoverished prior 
to the Syrian conflict and that have received a high number of refugees (Mercy Corps, 2015). 
The aim of LHSP is to increase social stability, build the abilities of host communities, address 
tensions, prevent conflict, and ensure peaceful co-existence through improving livelihoods and 
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service provision. Targeting the poorest communities, LHSP identifies interventions that alleviate 
the stress caused by the increased population in these areas.
7
  
LHSP is divided into three themes:  
1. improving the delivery of basic services within the municipality or union of municipalities;  
2. support for livelihoods and employment generation;  
3. conflict prevention and peacebuilding.  
Efforts focusing on supporting host communities and municipalities to cope with the impact of the 
Syrian conflict have involved collaborative projects with the municipalities and communities in 
order to help them to identify core needs and to allow for quick action and potentially avoid 
tension. The Ministry of Social Affairs leads the implementation of ‘maps of risks and resources’, 
which is a participatory exercise that enables host communities and municipalities to jointly draft 
multi-sector action plans to address key challenges and risks to the community (UNHCR, 2015). 
LHSP has increased livelihood and economic opportunities, strengthened local capacity to 
deliver services, improved local conflict resolution and security. Over 1 million Lebanese and 
500,000 Syrians have benefitted through LHSP.
8
 However, job creation for Lebanese citizens 
has been extremely limited and is one of the core reasons for animosity towards Syrians 
(UNHCR, 2015). 
4M Project 
With support from the European Decentralized Cooperation, UNDP is implementing the project 
“Support to Integrated Service Provision at the Local Level” (known as 4M). This uses a 
resilience-based approach to tackle problems in the health, social and education sectors. It 
supports the development of integrated health territorial plans and services to increase access to 
high-quality primary health care services for vulnerable communities (Mercy Corps, 2015). 
USAID 
From 2013 USAID restructured its programmes relating to expanding public services, improving 
livelihoods, and increasing business opportunities in order to help host communities deal with the 
increasing strain of the large numbers of refugees on the wider system. Through this programme 
USAID trains municipal leaders in heavily impacted communities to work jointly with populations 
to carry out projects that improve services and create economic opportunities. They are also 
working to promote economic opportunities for all vulnerable communities, use micro agriculture 
schemes to supplement rural households’ income, and lend money to small businesses facing 
challenges related to Syrian refugees (USAID, 2015).  
Lebanon Compact 
The Lebanon Compact, which was agreed in London in February 2016, focused on fostering job 
and educational opportunities for all of Lebanon’s vulnerable groups and not just refugees. In 
exchange for a commitment of around Euros 400M, Lebanon committed to allow the temporary 
stay of Syrian refugees. However, Lebanon imposed further restrictions on residency for Syrians 
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and with expensive renewals of residency permit many were pushed into precarious situations 
(Betts et al., 2017).     
DFID 
DFID funds through humanitarian organisations have been used to support host Lebanese 
communities to cope with the growing number of refugees. In the Bekaa valley, where there is a 
high level of poverty and a large number of refugees, these programmes have been extremely 
important. Initiatives include work schemes for both refugees and Lebanese, vaccinations and 
food for Lebanese livestock, repairs and upgrading of schools, water and sewage infrastructures. 
These types of programmes are particularly important, as the war in Syria has exacerbated pre-
existing fault lines in Lebanese society between those who support and those who don’t support 
the Assad regime. These tensions extend to refugees with them being blamed for a range of 
issues.
9
   
Local initiatives 
Basmeh and Zeitooneh (BZ) is a Syrian-led group mainly operating in the Shatila refugee camp 
in Beirut. As well as providing for the needs within the camp, BZ also focuses on promoting 
social cohesion between the refugees and host community. One of their projects is to renovate 
houses in the area, which benefits both the host community and the refugees. BZ also brings the 
communities together in a positive manner. It organised a three-month cleaning campaign in 
Beirut, which brought together children from the refugee school and their Lebanese and 
Palestinian friends in Beirut (Saferworld and Conciliation Resources, 2015).  
4. Criticisms 
Although there has been an increase in aid towards vulnerable Lebanese households, they are 
still largely overlooked by the aid community and the growing animosity of Lebanese toward 
Syrians is partly due to the uneven response to the needs of both populations. The emergency 
aid given is needed by both Syrians and Lebanese who are negatively impacted by the strain of 
the increased population. However, according to Mercy Corps (2013) aid needs to move beyond 
emergency and toward medium-term support to enable both vulnerable Lebanese and Syrians 
become more financially secure. Job creation and economic development have been limited with 
a far stronger focus on providing direct aid and services. Mercy Corps (2013) argues that:  
 Training needs to be provided to make people more financially aware and to enable them 
to manage their resources, as well as asset management skills and behaviours to 
strengthen household production of goods and services of value.  
 Training can be used to create social cohesion by bringing Syrians and Lebanese 
together around a common cause, as the greater the interaction the lesser the animosity 
between the two communities. As it is now clear that Syrians are not going home anytime 
soon, more effort should be made at repairing the damaged relationships between the 
two communities, rather than purely focusing on measures to prevent animosity from 
growing further.  
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In an assessment carried out for International Alert respondents highlighted that in healthcare 
most INGOs focused on individual approaches to address tensions between host and refugee 
communities, rather than an institutional approach of building it into programmes. Sustaining 
medical care with limited resources and potential funding cuts remained their main priority 
(Integrity Consultancy, 2014). 
Carpi (2017a) argues that funds that were being used to address vulnerable communities in 
Lebanon and the impact of the July 2006 war were redirected towards aid for Syrian refugees 
and this reallocation of funds interrupted several ongoing projects and this in turn reinforces new 
welfare systems. Taking these resources away from projects that aimed to reinforce the non-
emergency system only acts to weaken it and in Lebanon this has been a continuous cycle with 
progress constantly reverted. This process forces local NGOs and municipal actors to also 
address short-term needs in order to comply with international actors’ requirements and gain 
funds. This in turn leads to them no longer working towards improving the conditions of 
vulnerable communities who are not part of the new emergencies. Aid also acts to reinforce local 
actors who are needed to carry out programmes and who implement them based on their own 
idea of the social order; thus humanitarian agencies become mere donors and their projects are 
rescaled to fit the narrative of local actors. 
Capri (2017b) is also critical of the humanitarian livelihood programmes in Lebanon arguing that 
they have little impact on the local economy. She argues that the presence of humanitarian 
agencies has more impact. However, only local educated youth get employment within the 
humanitarian agencies, strengthening local middle classes whilst vulnerable and impoverished 
Lebanese do not tend to benefit. Rather they face the additional strain of having to compete over 
the same resources and jobs with refugees who due to aid can work for less. Moreover, 
livelihood programmes are not targeted and those who do join them are not necessarily the right 
candidates - rather the ones who managed to hear about them (Capri, 2017b) 
Finally, a number of social tensions stem from the memory of the civil war in Lebanon, which is 
aggravated by the Syrian refugees – connected to Syria’s history of occupation. The history of 
violence and tension in Lebanon should not be ignored by humanitarian actors; some tensions 
are historical and cannot be alleviated through humanitarian actions (Carpi et al., 2016).  
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